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Avoiding "Star Wars" - Celebrity creation as media strategy
Abstract
Media companies generally enjoy increasing profits if more customers watch a program. The viewer
drawing capability of stars serves as a prominent instrument to increase the audience. The literature
distinguishes between two different types of stars: highly talented and therefore ‘self-made' superstars,
and famous but ‘manufactured' and thus rather trivial celebrities. Whereas ‘self-made' superstars attract
viewers by providing services of superior quality, ‘manufactured' celebrities draw attention by
fabricated fame. Illustrating the Pop Idol series and comparing the abilities of superstars and celebrities
to generate and to capture value, we show why ‘manufacturing' celebrities is a lucrative business for the
media.
Avoiding ‘Star Wars’ – Celebrity Creation as Media Strategy
Egon Franck and Stephan Nu¨esch
I. INTRODUCTION
In the advertiser-supported media sector media content like television pro-
grams,newspaper copies, ormagazinearticles are sold tomedia consumers and
the attracted audiences can be packaged, priced and sold to advertisers.
Therefore, audiences are the main currency for media ﬁrms (Doyle 2002).
Broadcasters do not only broadcast programs; they are in particular in the
business of producing audiences (Owen and Wildman 1992). In general the
proﬁts of media companies increase with the number of viewers per program
since mass media typically operate under increasing returns to scale. For
example, once a television program has been produced, the extra cost of
an additional viewer is very small. The audience attracting capability of stars
is one of the traditional instruments employed to increase the number of
viewers. The literature distinguishes between twodiﬀerent types of stars: highly
talented and therefore ‘self-made’ superstars (see Rosen 1981, Adler 1985,
MacDonald 1988, Borghans and Groot 1998), and ‘manufactured’ and thus
rather trivial celebrities (see e.g. Boorstin 1961, Gamson 1994, Marshall 1997,
Cowen 2000, Turner 2004). Both kinds of stars increase audience interest and
draw attention. But whereas ‘self-made’ superstars set themselves apart by
superior talent, celebrities draw people by pure fame ‘fabricated’ by media
publicity.
‘Self-made’ superstars attract audiences based on their perceived excellence
in the provision of a certain service. PlacidoDomingo has convinced the opera
fans around the world of his exceptional voice just as Diego Maradona has
persuaded the international football fans of his outstanding technical abilities
on the pitch. Both became superstars because they were considered to be the
(or among the) most talented performers in their ﬁeld. Hausman and Leonard
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We are very grateful to Leif Brandes for suggesting the ‘Star Wars’ metaphor used in the title.
(1997) for example found out that themere presence of superstars likeMichael
Jordan had a substantial positive impact on national television ratings of
NBA matches. Several studies in the movie sector clearly indicate that super-
stars promote the success of the ﬁlms in which they play (see e.g. Wallace,
Seigerman, and Holbrook 1993, Prag and Cassavant 1994, Albert 1998,
Franck and Opitz 2003, Elberse 2006). Media provide access to superstars
inmany diﬀerent ways, for example by broadcasting a top sports competition,
by airing an interview with an excellent singer or by inviting a successful actor
to a talk-show.
Recently broadcasted reality television shows like e.g.Pop Idol are based on
a diﬀerent star concept: They ‘create’ stars out of anonymous performers by
providing themamedia platformandallowing theviewers to pick a singer tobe
groomed as a star. The format Pop Idol which was ﬁrst aired 2001 in England
has had tremendous success. Meanwhile, the show is broadcasted in 110
countries. Pop Idol is just one format – but possibly the most successful – of
hundreds of reality television shows recently ﬂooding the television programs.
The reality shows range from reality soaps like Expedition Robinson,
Big Brother, or I’m a Celebrity, Get Me Out of Here!, other casting shows like
America’s Next Top Model, to docu-soaps starring celebrities like The
Anna Nicole Smith Show, The Simple Life (with Paris Hilton and Nicole
Richie), or Newlyweds (with Jessica Simpson) just to name a few. Reality
television has rapidly come to occupy a place at the forefront of contemporary
television culture (Holmes 2004a). Of course, the idea of manufacturing
celebrities is not new: For example, this strategy was already used by television
quiz shows during the 1950s or by major recording labels during the late
1960s to ‘create’ celebrities like the Monkees as a televised alternative for
the Beatles.
Before the ‘graphic revolution’ it was generally necessary to have demon-
strated great deed or action in order to become a well-known and attention-
drawing star (Smart 2005). Mass-media, however, allow stardom to be
artiﬁcially created by media publicity and promotion. Recent information
technology and the Internet have even extended the capacity to create, transmit
and disseminate images of celebrities. Whereas there is still a loose connection
between talent, winning the contest and the ensuing celebrity status in casting
shows likePop Idol, other reality formats like e.g.BigBrotherdonot evenclaim
to select the winner according to any special achievements. Through such
pseudo-events anyone may become famous. Boorstin (1961) speaks of people
who are just known for being well-known. Apart from their fame, ‘manufac-
tured’ celebritiesmaybe trivial and superﬁcial. But the rating success ofmost of
the reality television shows still proves that celebritieshavehighviewerdrawing
capability. Thus, the attraction of large audiences is not necessarily based on
exceptional talent; pure fame suﬃces.
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In this paper, we compare the basic economicmechanismswhich explain the
emergence of traditional ‘self-made’ stars and ‘manufactured’ celebrities.
Based on these mechanisms we show that ‘self-made’ stars and celebrities are
comparable in theirpotential to generate value in themedia industry.However,
whereas ‘self-made’ stars become endowed with market power through the
very mechanisms which create them, celebrities have inferior opportunities to
capture the value created by their appearance. Therefore, themedia companies
are able to capture the bulk of the proﬁts from ‘manufacturing’ celebrities.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: First, we describe the
reality television showPopIdolasa case studyof ‘manufacturing’ celebrities. In
the second part of the paper, we analyse the economic mechanisms explaining
the emergence of ‘self-made’ stars as well as of celebrities and compare their
consequenceswith respect to viewer drawing capability and bargaining power.
In a last section, the ﬁndings are summarised.
II. POP IDOL – AN EXAMPLE OF ‘MANUFACTURING’
CELEBRITIES
Pop Idol originated 2001 in theUKas a public singing contest to determine the
best undiscovered young singers in a country. The format starts with televised
auditionswhere contestants are gradually selectedby sarcastic judges.Theﬁnal
participants perform live on television each week and viewers then vote by
phone or text message for their favourite. The singer with the least votes leaves
each week until a winner is crowned. The winner then receives a management
contractwith 19Entertainment and a recording contract withBMG (Mortimer
2004). Pop Idol was an immediate rating success. The ﬁnal episode attracted a
viewing audience of 13.2 million, or a total audience share of 57%. The ﬁrst
ﬁnal ofAmerican Idol – theUSversionofPop Idol – generated record ratings of
23million viewers, whichwas the biggest audience for a non-sports program at
that time in over ten years.American Idol also generated an unprecedented 110
million telephone votes over the progress of the ﬁrst ﬁnal shows (Dann 2004).
And the success has continued: The average number of viewers of American
Idol increased from 26.5 million in 2005 (Daly 2006) to 30 million in 2006
(Zeitchik and LaPorte 2006)1.
Pop Idol was devised by the British artist manager Simon Fuller and a
director ofBMG, SimonCowell. SimonFullerbeganhis career as a talent scout
in the 1980s. In 1985 he launched the keyboard maestro Paul Hardcastle and
1. The British Pop Idol show was replaced by the casting format The X Factor after the second series.
Simon Fuller claimed that The X Factor was a copy of his own show and ﬁled a lawsuit against the
producers of The X Factor. In November 2005 an out-of-court settlement was reached.
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guided his song, ‘19’, to the number one spot. In the same year he founded the
company 19 Entertainment2 which has grown and diversiﬁed to become a
group of numerous companies covering television, music management, music
publishing, recording, artist and producer management, sponsoring and
promotion (Sanghera 2002). For example Fuller created and managed the
SpiceGirlsand launched teenactSClub7.19Televisionwas formed in1997asa
subsidiary company of 19 Entertainment to produce or co-produce television
shows or ﬁlms. In 2001 it started Pop Idol in the UK in cooperation with
Thames TV which internationally trades as Fremantle Media. Since then, Pop
Idol has spun oﬀ several successes such as American Idol, Canadian Idol,
Australian Idol to name just a few. In March 2005 Simon Fuller sold 19
Entertainment to Robert Sillerman’s company CKX for $196 million (Serwer
2005). Fuller, however, has remained the chief executive.
In just a few years the Pop Idol format has developed to a multi-million
poundbrandoperating all over theworld. In 2006, 34 local versions ofPop Idol
air in 110 countries. The music expert Michael Learmonth (2006) names Pop
Idol a ‘diamond-studded annuity that generates in excess of $1 billion a year
worldwide through advertising, sponsorships, license fees, merchandising,
telephone voting, record sales and touring’. The Los Angeles Times estimated
that already the annual global advertising revenues of the Pop Idol format
exceed $1 billion (Hardy 2004). Exact data is not available. However, it is
undoubted that the Pop Idol shows are a very lucrative business.
In the UK, Fuller’s 19 Television company and Thames Television have an
equal share of ownership in thePop Idol format. Internationally, the television
rights of the Pop Idol format are held by 19 Television for two-thirds in
conjunctionwithFremantleMediawhichowns one-third.FremantleMedia is a
television production subsidiary of Europe’s largest television and radio group
RTL, itself 90%ownedbyGermanmedia conglomerateBertelsmann. Over the
period 2002–2003 19 Television and Fremantle Media received over $250
million in format fees (Hardy 2004). However, broadcasters did not miss
out. They obtained considerable Idol-related advertising revenues. All the
global Pop Idol shows in the years 2002–2003 generated over $2 billion
advertising revenues according to the Los Angeles Times. The US-based Fox
network for example gained $200million advertising income from the ﬁrst two
seasons ofAmerican Idol (Hardy 2004).During the fourthAmerican Idol series
in 2005 Fox sold ads at an average price of about $600,000 per 30-second spot.
According to Lieberman (2005) this summed up to at least $444 million
advertising income.
2. In the beginning, Fuller’s company was named 19Management, but he later changed the company’s
name to 19 Entertainment.
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Another signiﬁcant revenue stream is derived from merchandising the Idol
brand, which is split between 19 Entertainment and FremantleMedia. Accord-
ing to FremantleMedia, in the last three month of 2003 more than $45 million
ofmerchandise associatedwithAmerican Idolwas sold in theUS (Hardy2004).
Consumers candrink fromtheir idol’smug,download theartists’ ring tones for
their own phone or sing along to the branded karaoke system. Even video
games, cell phone faceplates, or perfumes are sold as licensedproducts. In 2004
consumers spent about $215 million on Idol-licensed products mostly for
typical pop-culture products: toys, candies, trading cards, games, a magazine
and books (Lieberman 2005). The sales of albums, singles and music videos
associatedwith thePop Idol format in theUS,UKandGermany totalled some
additional $170 million from 2003 to 2004 (Hardy 2004).
Even though the winners of Pop Idol enjoy enormous fame and publicity,
ﬁnancially they do not proﬁt likewise. A very detailed contract between the
participantsandFuller’s19Entertainmentguaranteesona clear ‘take itor leave
it’ basis that the young performers are wrapped up for recording, management
and merchandising under very restrictive terms for three years. Gary Fine, a
music attorney, made this ‘particularly aggressive’ contract public as he came
into possessionof itwhen amother of a youngmanwhowas interested in being
on the show brought it for his perusal (Olsen 2002). The ﬁrst clause, for
example, says that the producers can record any and all behaviour of the
contestant ‘in and in connection with the series’ and use the contestant’s
likeness, voice and biographical material, whether true or false any way they
want to. The producers own all this material forever and everywhere. The
second clause says that all information regarding the show and this contract is
strictly conﬁdential and if a contestant breaches this conﬁdentiality, it will
cause damages assumed to be in excess of $5 million. A further clause requires
each ﬁnalist to enter into agreements exclusively with 19 Recording for
recording of solo albums;3 19 Merchandising for advertising, endorsement,
merchandising and sponsorship; and 19 Management for the management of
his or her career.All thiswas entirely at theoptionofFuller’s 19Entertainment,
save for the winner, whowas guaranteed this result. Another clause even states
that the Idolwinner has to appear at the laterWorld Idol program4, for a total
fee of just $1,400 (Olsen2002). 19Entertainment virtually controls all aspects of
the singers under contract. Somemusic experts say that the careers ofPop Idol
ﬁnalists are literally not their own. An example: 19 Entertainment arranged for
Kelly Clarkson, winner of the ﬁrst American Idol show, to sing the American
national anthem at the ﬁrst September 11 anniversary in Washington D.C.
Several newspapers and prominent persons criticised it, questioning if a day of
3. The recording rights, however, are mostly licensed out to BMG.
4. In theWorld Idol program thewinners of the various national Idol shows compete against each other.
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nationalmourning shall be turned into agiant promotionalopportunity (Dann
2004). In response, Clarkson wanted to cancel her obligation. She was quoted
in theNewYorkTimes, saying: ‘If anyone thinks I’m trying tomarket anything,
well, that’s awful. I amnot going to do it – I amnot going to sing onSeptember
11’5. The next day 19 Management issued a press release and clariﬁed that
Clarkson will sing the national anthem on September 11 inWashington D. C.
and that media reports to the contrary are incorrect (Dann 2004). Kelly
Clarkson had no other choice. The very restrictive contracts between the Pop
Idol singers and 19 Entertainment restrain the singers’ careers ﬁnancially as
well. 19 Entertainment receives 10% of their recording revenue (Serwer 2005).
The management fee is estimated to be an additional 15–20% (James 2002).
And 19 Merchandising also generously partakes of the merchandising and
touring6 revenue. In a rare interview with The Associated Press, Simon Fuller
describedhismanager-client relationshipswith the Idol contestants as ‘partner-
ships’, in which he receives between 25% and 50% percent of their earnings.
The industry standard, however, is a 20%management fee (Ehlers andWriter
2004).
19 Entertainment is eﬀectively structuring a global base for Pop Idol, which
generatesmoney not simply from the sale of the format and the exploitation of
the promoted celebrities, but also frommultimedia platforms, phone calls and
the Internet (Holmes 2004b). According to Learmonth (2006), 19 Entertain-
ment and Fremantle Media together receive 50% of revenues from cellular
phone calls and instant messaging. Given the tremendous numbers of votes,
this is considerable money. In 2003, 7.5 million viewers of American Idol cast
votes by textmessages. One year later the number increased to 13.5million and
thenanother year latermore than tripled to41.5million textmessages (Zeitchik
andLaporte 2006). In 2003 therewere 60million phone calls forAmerican Idol.
The chief executive of Fremantle Media Licensing Worldwide estimates that
more than a billion phone votes have been cast globally for Idol contestants in
the years 2003 and 2004. In 2006 580 million votes were cast during the ﬁfth
seasonofAmerican Idol. In theUKalone, each serieswas estimated to generate
$9 million by phone and text message voting (Mortimer 2004).
The business model of Pop Idol is rather simple: Take unknown but
ambitious young individuals who are willing to sign recording, management
or merchandising rights away, equip them with stardom and sell access to the
‘fabricated’ celebrities. Every year ten thousands of individuals audition for
various Idol contests. Few if any of those amateur or semi-professional singers
have experience or track record in the music industry. Their bargaining power
5. See Kuczynski (2002) quoted in Dann (2004, p. 17).
6. According to the Billboard magazine ticket buyers spent more than $28 million in 2004 to see the
ﬁnalists of American Idol (Lieberman 2005).
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is very low. Most candidates will sign anything the show’s producer puts in
front of them, because potential earnings of Idol ﬁnalists are still higher than
alternative earnings as workaday Janes and Joes (Piccoli 2006). The big
proﬁteers, however, are both production companies – 19 Entertainment and
Fremantle Media – and the television broadcasters. According to Learmonth
(2006) the twoproduction companieshave retainedan ‘unusually large stake in
themyriad revenue streams’ the show generates.Pop Idol turned Simon Fuller
into the second richest ‘millionaire in ﬁlm and television’ with an estimated
fortuneof $540million (BeresfordandBoyd2006).The televisionbroadcasters
have proﬁted as well. According to various network estimates, reality shows
likePop Idol cost about half asmuch to produce – about $600,000 per hour – as
typical new dramas or sitcoms.Pop Idol does not require new sets, or stars who
ask for $1 million-an-episode salaries, as the actors of the series Friends
successfully did in 2003. And Pop Idol tends to be popular with the audience
advertisers desire most: young women (Farhi 2003).
Pop Idol explicitly distinguished itself from prior casting shows (e.g.
Popstars) in its invocation of audience interactivity and popular taste. The
creators promoted Pop Idol insisting ‘But this time, you choose!’ (Holmes
2004b). As a result of this procedure rather popularity-driven celebrities
emerge, because the candidate with the largest fan-support wins. Becoming
the winner of Pop Idol is less an issue of talent and more one of sympathy and
compatibility to popular taste. Experience shows that the ‘manufactured’
celebrities in general couldnot sustainaudience interest in theirworkwhen they
lost the publicity generated by appearing weekly on prime time television.
While the initial success of some of the individual singles or albums ofPop Idol
ﬁnalists has been extraordinary (the ﬁrst UK, Australian or American singles,
in particular, went to number one immediately), most of the singers have not
been able to repeat their initial success nor to construct a continuing career
(Turner 2004). They have had only mixed achievements outside the safety of
the created popularity bubble.
To examine general publicity of the American Idol ﬁnalists, we measured
how often they were mentioned in the press by conducting a text analysis of
articles in numerous quality and tabloid newspapers as well as weekly
magazines7. Figures 1 to 3 illustrate the number of monthly articles which
mention the ﬁnalists of the ﬁrst three American Idol series by name.
7. The database used contains quality newspapers (including e.g. USA Today, The New York Times,
International Herald Tribune, Los Angeles Times, Chicago Tribune, The Boston Globe, ChicagoDaily
Herald, The Denver Post, Detroit Free Press, Florida Today, The Kansas City Star, Miami Herald,
The Washington Post), tabloid newspapers (e.g. The Edmonton Sun, The Boston Herald), press
agencies likeTheAssociatedPress, weeklymagazines (includingLife, TheEconomist,HoustonPress)
or music magazines (including e.g. Billboard, BBC Music Magazine, or Variety).
r 2007 The Authors. Journal compilationr 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 217
AVOIDING ‘STARWARS’
Figure1 indicates thatonly thewinnerof theﬁrstAmerican Idol season,Kelly
Clarkson, has had lasting visibility in the press. After the television show in
summer 2002, she attracted largemedia attention by releasing a successful solo
album in April 2003, appearing on theWorld Idol contest in December 2003
and by launching a very successful second album in spring 2005. In February
2006 she won two Grammies and enjoyed more publicity than ever before.
Kelly Clarkson was able to use the show’s publicity bubble as a stepping stone
for a successful individual pop career. By receiving honours of the prestigious
Recording Academy, Clarkson deﬁnitely achieved superstar status and eman-
cipated herself from the televised contest that originally made her famous.
However, all other ﬁnalists of the ﬁrst series of American Idol have vanished
into thin air.
During the secondAmerican Idol contest both the winner and the runner-up
snowballed into famous celebrities with monthly publicity scores of over
800 articles (see Figure 2). Their media coverage after the show has been –
although very ﬂuctuating – generally decreasing. BesidesRuben Studdard and
Clay Aiken, who were able to call attention by releasing rather successful
personal singles and albums or by extensive touring, the other ﬁnalists’
celebrity status disappeared once the showwent oﬀ the air. The publicity peak
of Corey Clark in May 2005 was an exception. It proved that pure rumours
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Figure 1
Articles mentioning the American Idol ﬁnalists of season 1
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suﬃce to attract media attention. Although his recordings never reached the
charts, heprominentlyplacedhimself in themedia spotlight byclaiming thathe
and oneof the show’s judges, PaulaAbdul, had an aﬀair during the contest.He
thereby proﬁted from the enormous popularity of the fourth season of
American Idol in which Paula Abdul was on the air at that time. However,
the fame bubble of Corey Clark burst as quickly as it formed.
Figure 3 gives a typical illustration of the media coverage of ‘manufac-
tured’ and thus rather trivial celebrities: The enormous publicity created
during the television show rapidly decreased after the show. No one of the
ﬁnalists has ever reached comparable publicity scores since then. Fantasia
Barrino, Diana DeGamo, and Jasmine Trias lost their fame as quickly as
it came.
III. A STRATEGY FRAMEWORK OF STAR ATTRACTION
IN THEMEDIA
From a simple strategy perspective the success of a company depends on
two elements: value creation and value capture. A media enterprise has a
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Figure 2
Articles mentioning the American Idol ﬁnalists of season 2
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competitive advantage if it is able to create and obtain more economic value
than the marginal (breakeven) competitor in its product market (Peteraf and
Barney 2003). In order to prosper, a ﬁrmmust not only be able to create value,
but to capture the value it creates (Saloner, Shepard, and Podolny 2001).
Referring to stars this means that the proﬁts of media ﬁrms are positively
related to the viewer drawing capability of stars and negatively to their
bargaining power as external resource suppliers.
The media provide a production technology suitable to create, promote
or exploit stardom8. The consumption of media content is generally non-rival.
If a person watches a television broadcast, it does not diminish someone else’s
opportunity of watching it as well. Media content does not get used up or
destroyed in the act of consumption (Doyle 2002). The production of media
content is subject to large economies of scale, because the production costs
are largely independent of the size of the audience. The same content may
be marketed under a windowing process in which it is delivered to consumers
via multiple distribution channels sequentially in diﬀerent time periods.
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Figure 3
Articles mentioning the American Idol ﬁnalists of season 3
8. It is no surprise that the occupations of stars are generally closely related to the media: e.g. actors,
musicians, or athletes (Borghans and Groot 1998).
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The expenses involved in generating the ﬁrst copy tend to be considerable.
However, once the ﬁrst copy of the program has been created, it then
costs little or nothing to reproduce it to extra customers. The value of the
program to the viewer is unaﬀected by the number of viewers, but the value
of the commercial to the advertiser is directly and positively linked to
audience size. Thus increasing returns will be enjoyed as more and more
customerswatch a program.The larger the audience, themore proﬁtable it will
become for the producer (Doyle 2002). Therefore, the viewer drawing
capability is crucial. Superstars are providers of media content with high
viewer drawing capability. Economic theory oﬀers two distinct explanations
why this might be the case.
3.1. The Rosen Explanation for the Viewer Drawing Capability of Superstars
In his seminal paper on ‘The Economics of Superstars’ Sherwin Rosen deﬁnes
superstars as ‘relatively small numbers of people who earn enormous amounts
of money and dominate the activities in which they engage’ (Rosen 1981,
p. 845). Given a production technology that allows for joint consumption and
scale economies9, output may be concentrated among a few individuals who
have the most talent. Rosen’s superstar theory is based on two basic premises:
Firstly, lower quality is an imperfect substitute of higher quality. People prefer
consuming fewer high-quality services rather than more of the same service at
moderate quality levels: ‘(y) hearing a successionofmediocre singers does not
add up to a single outstanding performance’ (Rosen 1981, p. 846).Most people
tendnot to be satisﬁedwith theperformanceof a less talentedbut cheaper artist
when they are able to enjoy the performance of a top artist even if the cost is
somewhat higher (Frey 1998). Secondly, Rosen (1981) assumes that talent or
quality is costlessly observable by all potential consumers. Therefore, small
diﬀerences in talent are magniﬁed into large diﬀerences in earnings. In Rosen’s
model, a single superstar (or a single group of superstars) – the best – serves the
whole market (Schulze 2003). Superstars attract audiences by providing
performances of comparably higher quality.
The plausibility of Rosen’s assumptions largely depends on the sector or job
in which a star is engaged. The performance of a 100 meter sprinter, for
9. Media typically provide such a technology. Of course, public performances of a classical concert for
example may exhibit a unit cost decrease with rising audience size too. However, there will be
congestion costs at some point as a classical live concert is more enjoyable in a medium-sized concert
hall than in a large sport arena (Schulze 2003).Media eliminate congestion, since the superstar activity
can easily be replicated through CD productions, television performances, videos, movies or books.
These ‘canned performances’ display higher scale economies and a higher personal scale of operations
(Schulze 2003).Media technologymakes it possible for large parts of theworldmarket tobe servedby
one person.
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example, is clearly and unambiguously determined by the running time. The
sprinter’s talent is easily identiﬁable and measurable. And in general, people
favour watching the ﬁnales in the Olympic Games rather than ten runs at
mediocre levels. Concerning artistic activities, however, quality determination
is a lotmore diﬃcult. Consumers havemanifold tastes and their understanding
of quality is highly diversiﬁed. While some people love the songs ofMadonna,
others may hate them. Commonly accepted and clearly measurable talent
indicators are often not available. Hence Rosen’s second assumption is less
plausible in arts. Hamlen (1991, 1994) or Salganik, Dodds, and Watts (2006)
fail to ﬁnd empirical evidence for Rosen’s superstar explanation in the popular
music industry.
3.2. The Adler Explanation for the Viewer Drawing Capability of Superstars
Adler (1985) explains the phenomenon of superstars as a learning process that
occurs if consumption requires knowledge. Based on the notion of ‘consump-
tion capital’ byStigler andBecker (1977),Adler (1985) argues that appreciation
of a star’s performance increases with knowledge: ‘y the more you know the
more you enjoy’ (Adler 1985, p. 208–209). Stigler and Becker (1977) use music
as an example of how past consumption activities lead to beneﬁcial addiction
through an accumulation of consumption capital. By having exposed them-
selves to music in the past, consumers have built up consumption capital that
enables them to derive more pleasure from listening to the same music in the
present. Stigler and Becker (1977) themselves referred toMarshall (1923) who
hadwritten: ‘(y) themore goodmusic aman hears, the stronger is his taste for
it likely to become’10. When discussing the taste for good music, Alfred
Marshall had probably some distinguished operas or classical music in mind.
For example, Beethoven connoisseurs feel great pleasure in listening to
symphonies, concertos, or operas of Beethoven, since speciﬁc consumption
capital allows them to appreciate subtle details and delicacies of his composi-
tions. This explains why consumers will not diversify indeﬁnitely either across
activities, or across individuals within a given activity; however, it does not
explain why everybody would choose to have the same superstars. Adler
(1985) supplemented the Stigler/Becker-framework by adding the element of
discussing consumption with likewise knowledgeable individuals. Star speciﬁc
consumption capital is not only accumulated by past consumption activities,
but also by discussing the star’s performance with other people who know
about it. Themore popular the superstar in question is, the lower the searching
10. Original statement in Marshall (1923, p. 94) quoted in Stigler and Becker (1977, p. 78). The
accentuation is introduced by the authors.
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costs to ﬁnd competent discussants will consequently be. Searching cost
economies imply that one is always better oﬀ patronising a well-known star
as long as others are not perceived as superior by an order ofmagnitude. These
positive network externalities explain why superstars may even emerge among
equally talented performers.
3.3. Bargaining Power of Superstars
The existence of rents is not suﬃcient for a media ﬁrm to earn above average
returns. If the resourceswhich generate the rents are not owned by the ﬁrm, the
suppliers (in our case the superstars) may bid up the price of their resources to
the point where they capture the diﬀerential value won from customers
(Bowman andAmbrosini 2000). The question howmuch value themedia ﬁrm
is able to retain is answered by the relative bargaining powers of the resource
supplier and the ﬁrm. Resource suppliers with a powerful bargaining position
are able to capture a large proportion of the created value, whereas resource
suppliers with weak bargaining power will ﬁnd themselves obtaining far less
value. How powerful are superstars as external resource suppliers of media
content?
In Rosen’s theory superstars have a certain degree of monopolistic power
due to their exceptional talent. Since consumers strongly prefer to watch the
best performers, superstars are not replaceable without signiﬁcant quality
losses. Superstars cannot be separated from the activity in which they excel.
Therefore, they display high bargaining power, which enables them to capture
large parts of the generated rents (Borghans and Groot 1998).
InAdler’s (1985) star theory, superstars enjoy high bargaining power due to
the star speciﬁc consumption capital. Since consumption capital is irreversible
and not transferable, it creates lock-in-eﬀects and signiﬁcant switching costs.
Thus Adler stars have high bargaining power. For example, a person who has
become a connoisseur of the actress Meg Ryan is not willing to substitute a
moviewithMegRyan foronewithouther.Ravid (1999) shows thatmovie stars
capturemost of the value added they create. There exists broad casual evidence
indicating that movie stars very quickly adjust their fees to reﬂect their value.
John Travolta for instance multiplied his fee by almost 100 after the success of
his ﬁlm Pulp Fiction. Weinstein (1998) who analyses the evolution of proﬁt-
sharing contracts in the Hollywood movie sector illustrates how proven stars
aremore likely to sign contractswith gross-proﬁt shares. Superstars havemore
assertiveness and require higher remuneration. They take this compensation in
the form of a proﬁt or revenue share. Weinstein (1998) argues that sharing
contracts are not primarily intended to align the incentives of actors with those
of the studios. They are rather a sign of high bargaining power. Superstars like
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JuliaRoberts, JimCarrey orTomHanks not only earn guaranteed $20million
but also 20%back end (Franck andOpitz 2003). Hence, in spite of revenues in
excess ofhalf a billiondollars, theﬁlmForrestGump for example failed tomake
a proﬁt (Ravid 1999). The marginal production costs of ﬁlms or television
programs partly do not decrease but increase with (expected) audience size.
Bourreau, Gensollen, and Perani (2002) explain what seems to be an atypical
production cost function for the media sector with the fact that superstars are
able to negotiate remuneration based on the expected mean audiences they
draw as a result of their rare talent.
We conclude that ‘self-made’ superstars in the sense of Rosen and Adler are
excellent in value creation and value capture.Media ﬁrms, therefore, have clear
incentives to ﬁnd substitutes with comparable value creation potential but less
bargaining power. In the following we argue that celebrities draw large
audiences without having substantial bargaining power to adopt the created
value.
IV. ‘MANUFACTURED’ CELEBRITIES
Despite thediﬀerences in the emergence ofRosen andAdler superstars, there is
also a unifying element in both theories. They presuppose that superstars have
exceptional talent and provide services of perceived superior quality. This
assumption is obvious for Rosen superstars. However, it is also required for
Adler stars because the notion of consumption capital stipulates that there is
hidden talent and/or quality which need to be discovered through a learning
process. If there was nothing to discover, learning would be superﬂuous and
consumption capital inexistent. Because their stardom is based on their own
capabilities Rosen and Adler stars are ‘self-made’ to a signiﬁcant degree.
This is not necessarily the case for celebrities. The most widely quoted
deﬁnition of celebrity was given by Boorstin (1961, p. 57): ‘The celebrity is a
person who is known for his well-knowness’. According to Boorstin (1961)
celebrities’ appearances are pseudo-events11; they appear to bemeaningful but
are in fact insubstantial. He explains the distinction between ‘self-made’ stars –
which he calls heroes – and celebrities as follows:
‘We can fabricate fame, we can at will (y) make a man or woman well known; but we cannot
make him great. We can make a celebrity, but we can never make a hero. (y) The hero created
himself; the celebrity is created by the media. The hero was a bigman; the celebrity is a big name’
(Boorstin 1961, p. 48161).
11. Turner (2004)describes a ‘pseudo-event’ as an event planned and staged entirely for themedia,which
accrues signiﬁcance through the scale of its media coverage rather than through any more
disinterested assessment of its importance.
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Celebrity status is artiﬁcially producible by media publicity. In the democracy
of pseudo-events anyone may become a celebrity if only he or she manages to
get into the news and to stay there (Boorstin 1961). Superstars all share
admirable qualities –qualities that somehowset themapart formthe rest ofus–
whereas celebrities need not do anything special (Gamson 1994). Concerning
superstars, fameand popularity are related to an exceptional talent. Celebrities
though are famous because they have been made to be. For example, reality
television turns ordinary people intowell-known celebrities just by providing a
publicity platform.
Marshall’s assumption that ‘(y) no celebrity possesses any meaning of
consequence’ (Marshall 1997, p. 11) is a heroic simpliﬁcation, of course. In
reality, the boundary between ‘self-made’ superstars and ‘manufactured’
celebrities is more blurred. Most celebrities may also have a moderate level
of talent and superstarshavealsoproﬁted frompublicityplatforms.But the fact
that thewell-knowness of celebrities hasbecomeaviable commodity all by itself
is intrinsic to their meaning. Famemay stand independent of accomplishment,
heroics, or talent (Rein, Kotler, Hamlin, and Stoller 2006). However, given
the postulated triviality of celebrities, how can their attraction be explained?
4.1. Viewer Drawing Capability of ‘Manufactured’ Celebrities
We argue that celebrities generate gossip externalities. They attract audiences
by providing a projection screen for all kind of rumours, judgments, or
interpretations. The pleasure of gossip lies in the exchange of news, in the
development of new story lines, in discussing and sharing evaluations. It is not
necessary for gossip that the information is demonstrably true; in fact, too
much truth can stop the gossip game (Gamson 1994). Celebrities are in many
ways better objects for this game than acquaintances like e.g. neighbours.
‘Celebrities are like neighbors whom nearly everyone knows, in nearly every social setting, and
‘stuﬀ’ about them is easier to ﬁnd and share than information about friends or colleagues. More
important, celebrity gossip is amuch freer realm,muchmore game-like than acquaintance gossip:
there are no repercussions and there is no accountability’ (Gamson 1994, p. 176).
JokeHermeswhowrote a book about ‘ReadingWomen’sMagazines’ observed
thatmostwomenﬁnd talkingabout their favourite celebrities a comfortableway
of spending their time with other people: ‘Gossip draws speakers together in
their sharing and evaluation of ‘news’ about ‘third personswho are not present’’
(Hermes1995,p. 131). JaneJohnson,a reporterof the successfulBritish celebrity
magazine Closer, even believes that: ‘Celebrity gossip is a national obsession
and a unifying experience across all social groups’ (Johnson 2004, p. 55).
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The interaction beneﬁt of gossip increases with the number of people
knowing the tidings of a particular celebrity. The activity of discussion, story
telling, interpretation, or judgment is typically subject to network externalities.
The more popular a celebrity is, the easier gossip circulation becomes. The
interaction beneﬁt is, therefore, an increasing function of the celebrity’s
popularity. This creates a self-energising virtuous cycle: a celebrity with a large
audience becomesmore andmore valuable to each viewer, as he or she attracts
evermore viewers. Leibenstein (1950) named the observation that people often
follow the crowd as ‘bandwagon eﬀect’. The bandwagon eﬀect emerges if
people’s valuations of a commodity (and thus demand for this good) increase
when they observe others consuming the same commodity. Banerjee (1992,
p. 798) deﬁnes this herd behaviour as ‘everyone doing what everyone else is
doing’. Individuals decidewhether or not to follow a rising celebrity depending
on the number of people currently paying attention to this person. Popular
support for an individual by themediamay thus suddenly gainmomentumand
escalate.Of course, bandwagon eﬀectsmight also happen randomly.But in the
majority of cases media corporations consciously set agenda12 and promote
new celebrities.
In contrast to Adler’s conception of superstars, star attraction of celebrities
is not linked to the consumption beneﬁt of the performance but rather to the
subsequent interaction beneﬁt. Therefore, the star attraction of celebrities is no
longer necessarily based on talent. Of course, positive network externalities of
popularity also exist in Adler’s superstar theory. According to Adler (1985)
popularity indirectly increases star attraction by simplifying the accumulation
of consumption capital. Consumption capital, however, has no value of its
own; it only generates a beneﬁt by enhancing the valuation of the star’s
performance. But the underlying quality of the performance still depends on
the star’s talent. Referring to Adler stars even enormous popularity cannot
replace missing talent.
4.2. Bargaining Power of ‘Manufactured’ Celebrities
The participants of the Pop Idol series are ordinary people who – due to the
high-proﬁle associated with the show – are becoming well-known celebrities.
Nobody would know them if they had not been in the media. Since celebrity
gossip does neither rely on extraordinary talent nor on speciﬁc consumption
capital, celebrities are easy to replace and, therefore, have low bargaining
12. See e.g.Maxwell and Shaw (1993) for a review on the research about ‘agenda setting’, which denotes
the media’s ability to inﬂuence the public’s opinion.
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power13. Pop Idol candidates who are not willing to sign the very restrictive
contracts are promptly exchanged by other applicants. Hence, media corpora-
tionsobtain the lion’s share of the generated revenues and routinely seek toﬁnd
unspoiled fresh prospects they can ‘discover’ and groom for stardom. In reality
television programs such as Pop Idol the media producers have incorporated
celebrity emergence into the format. Therefore, these celebrities are particu-
larly dependent upon the program that made them visible (Turner 2004).
4.3. Market Segmentation
Even though ‘manufacturing’ celebrities is more lucrative for the media
than employing ‘self-made’ superstars, it is obvious that a total substitution
of ‘self-made’ superstars in the media has not occurred. Why? Brieﬂy, the
market potential of ‘manufactured’ celebrities is limited to certain kinds of
entertainment like for example game shows, docu-soaps and pop music to
some extent. Celebrity ‘creation’ is feasible wherever an activity does not have
clearly measurable quality indicators and whenever its consumption does not
require speciﬁc knowledge. In sports or classical music, for example, celebrity
status cannot be created from scratch. A set of well-established tournaments
relying either on objective quality indicators like e.g. time performance and/or
on institutionalised voting procedures by proven expert judges determine
winners in these ﬁelds. The Olympic sprint ﬁnals or the Olympic gymnastics
ﬁnals are obviously not decided bypublic voting.Here audiences are interested
in thediscoveryof superior talent, and factors like the speedand thedexterityof
the contestants cannot be substituted by sympathy or publicity. As long as
audiences are interested in the talent superiority of performers, ‘self-made’
superstars will not disappear from the media despite their ability to capture
large parts of the generated economic value.
V. CONCLUSION
Broadcasting stars is a common strategy to increase audience size. However,
catching high attention and reaching high media ratings does not suﬃce to
capture a rent in a competitive environment. The latter strongly depends on the
relative bargaining powers of the stars as external resource suppliers and the
media ﬁrm. We analysed the viewer drawing capability and the bargaining
13. ‘Accidental celebrities’ (Turner, Bonner, and Marshall 2000), who are individuals getting into the
focus of attention initially throughanuncontrollable incident, however, can sell their stories for large
sums.Monica Lewinski, Diana’s former butler Paul Burrell, or kidnap victimNatascha Kampusch
are examples of this category. ‘Accidental celebrities’ are not interchangeable.
r 2007 The Authors. Journal compilationr 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd. 227
AVOIDING ‘STARWARS’
powerofboth superstars andcelebrities.Whereas ‘self-made’ superstars attract
audiences based on the perceived excellence of the provided service, celebrities
draw viewers by oﬀering a source of gossip. However, while superstars exert
strong bargaining power due to the singularity of their performances and/or
the consumers’ accumulation of speciﬁc consumption capital, ‘manufactured’
celebrities are interchangeable and thus have low market power to capture
value.Nowonder that the creation and exploitation of celebrities has becomea
large business in the media sector. But the market potential of ‘manufactured’
celebrities is limited because they typically prevail only in ‘talent free’
entertainment.
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SUMMARY
Media companies generally enjoy increasing proﬁts if more customers watch a program. The viewer
drawing capability of stars serves as a prominent instrument to increase the audience. The literature
distinguishes between twodiﬀerent types of stars: highly talented and therefore ‘self-made’ superstars, and
famous but ‘manufactured’ and thus rather trivial celebrities. Whereas ‘self-made’ superstars attract
viewers by providing services of superior quality, ‘manufactured’ celebrities draw attention by fabricated
fame. Illustrating the Pop Idol series and comparing the abilities of superstars and celebrities to generate
and to capture value, we show why ‘manufacturing’ celebrities is a lucrative business for the media.
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